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Abstract 
Who financed the great expansion of the Victorian equity market, and what attracted them to 
invest? Using data on 453 firm-years and over 172,000 shareholders, we find that the largest 
providers of capital were rentiers, men with no formal occupation who relied on investment 
income. We also see a substantial growth in women investors as time progressed. In terms of 
clientele effects, we find that rentiers invested in large firms, whilst businessmen were the 
venture capitalists of young, regional enterprises. Women and the middle classes preferred 
safe investments, whilst financiers and institutional investors were speculators in foreign 
companies. Our results may help to explain the growth of new types of assets catering for 
particular clienteles, and the development of managerial policies on dividends and share 
issues. 
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1. Introduction 
During the late Victorian era, large volumes of capital were provided by individual investors 
to thousands of publicly-traded companies.
1
 There has been an ongoing debate as to how the 
Victorians chose what securities to invest in, with a considerable amount of research into 
what encouraged British investors to export much of their capital overseas.
2
 However, there 
has been little analysis as to what other characteristics of securities were important, and how 
these characteristics may have attracted different types of investors.
3
  
 In this paper, we analyse what types of investors provided capital during the 
expansion of the equity market in the second half of the nineteenth century, with a focus on 
those firms which had been formed during this period. We also examine how the types of 
investor changed over that time period, and whether there were clientele effects, in that 
companies with particular attributes attracted certain types of shareholders. For example, 
were businessmen more likely to invest in young industrial firms? Were rentiers attracted to 
foreign companies, or firms based in London? Were female investors more likely to avoid 
newly-formed firms and invest in safe dividend-paying domestic stocks? 
To analyse these issues, we use shareholder records for companies created in the five 
decades after the liberalisation of incorporation law in the 1850s and 1860s.
4
  We have 
complete ownership records detailing the socio-occupational status of investors for 293 
companies and 453 company-years, giving us details of over 172,000 ordinary and preference 
shareholders. We categorise every shareholder according to their socio-occupational status, 
and analyse which firms attracted which investors.  
This analysis makes a major contribution in two ways. Firstly, we significantly 
enhance our understanding of who provided the capital that financed Victorian public 
companies.
5
 The largest group, which we refer to as rentiers, were males who did not have a 
defined occupation, suggesting that they were either retired or wealthy enough not to work. 
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Businessmen were also substantial providers of capital, although they became less important 
over time. The middle classes, consisting of professional and white-collar workers, and 
women provided similar amounts of capital overall. There was considerable growth in the 
amount contributed by female investors by the end of the century. Unlike the modern era, 
institutional shareholders such as investment trusts were not substantial investors in equities.   
Secondly, we determine what influenced investor behaviour during this era.
6
 We use 
company- and stock-specific data to explore whether there were clientele effects, with certain 
types of stocks and companies attracting different types of investors.  There have been some 
suggestions in previous literature as to what may have appealed to particular investor groups. 
Jefferys has argued that during the Victorian era, stocks which were marketable, had a low 
denomination, and no uncalled capital proved more attractive to the growing class of rentier 
investors.
7
 Because the yield on consols had declined by an unprecedented c.30 per cent in 
the last four decades of the nineteenth century, rentiers were motivated by a “search for 
yield” to move some of their portfolio into high-yield equities. Davis and Huttenback have 
suggested that the nobility and gentlemen were more inclined to invest in foreign and colonial 
securities, whilst businessmen favoured domestic enterprises.
8
 Rutterford et al. have argued 
that female investors invested in preference shares over ordinary, possibly because they were 
regarded as safer.
9
    
From our analysis, we find that rentiers tended to invest heavily in large companies, 
and avoided firms which were family owned. They were willing to invest in foreign firms, 
and companies based and traded in London, but this was largely driven by the financial 
characteristics of the securities, rather than by any bias.  In contrast, businessmen acted as 
venture capitalists, favouring young, domestic enterprises outside London. Women exhibited 
a preference for safe investments which paid a dividend, and had a low yield. The middle 
classes also favoured relatively safe preference shares. Financiers focused on highly liquid, 
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foreign securities, which they could easily trade and which may have offered higher returns, 
with institutional investors also concentrating on foreign firms.  
These patterns of investment help us to understand not only the behaviour of 
investors, but also the growth of particular asset classes. For example, women and the middle 
classes were risk-averse. Companies who wanted to appeal to such clienteles could have 
issued low-risk securities, and this may help to explain the growth of preference shares and 
corporate bonds.
10
 Such investors were also reluctant to invest directly in foreign companies, 
and the rise of investment trusts, which focused on overseas securities, may be explained by 
these risk-averse investors wanting professional help to choose international investments.  
The analysis of clienteles also adds a new dimension to our understanding of what 
influenced managerial decisions during this era. Companies may have taken into account 
what their particular clientele of investors preferred, which may have affected dividend 
policy, and the decision on what types of securities to issue.  
This paper sits within a growing literature on shareholders in the Victorian era, which 
has at least five strands. The first strand has been concerned with the geography and 
background of shareholders in early railways and during the Railway Mania of the mid-
1840s.
11
 The second has focused on investors in banks across the nineteenth century.
12
 Since 
many banks had unlimited liability and converted to limited liability, this literature has 
focussed on the wealth and suitability of shareholders. It has also focussed on the behaviour 
of bank investors, finding that investors exhibited a local bias, diversified when they should 
not have, and viewed bank stocks as consumption goods.
13
 The third strand looks at the 
relationship between gender and investment.
14
 This literature suggests that women were not 
as passive in this era as has been suggested and were willing to take the risks associated with 
equity investment. The fourth strand looks at who invested in foreign and colonial firms in 
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the pre-1913 era,
15
 whilst the final strand of the literature is socio-cultural in that it looks at 
novels and literary references to, as well as public perception of, investors.
16
 
This paper is related to a wider project which has focussed on corporate ownership in 
Victorian Britain, using ownership records for a sample of 488 companies. Previous papers 
from the project have examined the broad structure of corporate ownership (i.e., was 
ownership diffuse or concentrated?), the effect of corporate ownership structure on firm 
performance, and an analysis of the largest or dominant owners in these companies.
17
 This 
paper utilises the rich individual shareholder data collected for this project to analyse who 
invested in the new corporate economy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, in 
contrast to previous papers from this project, the current paper examines all shareholders in a 
firm, with a database of over 170,000 individuals.     
In addition to its historical insights, this paper also contributes to the financial 
economics literature on clienteles of investors. In the modern era most investment is 
channelled through financial institutions, so it is difficult to observe the characteristics and 
preferences of individual investors. On the contrary, in our sample, we can observe each 
investor, and determine more precisely their investment behaviour.       
This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some context by 
looking at the investment opportunity set of Victorian investors. Section three discusses our 
data sources and methodology.  Section four examines the socio-occupational background of 
shareholders and analyses differences over time and across industrial sectors. Sections five 
explains the empirical strategy and tests, which help us explore the determinants of investor 
clienteles in order to see the importance of investor home bias, risk, dividends, liquidity, 
share denomination, and uncalled capital for different groups of investors. Section six reports 
the results from these tests. Section seven briefly summarises our findings.  
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2. Investments in Victorian Britain  
What types of financial securities could an investor living in the second half of the nineteenth 
century invest in? In 1853, the nominal value of securities quoted on the Stock Exchange 
Official List was £1,215.3m; 70.2 per cent of securities in terms of value were British 
government debt securities, 18.5 per cent were railway securities, 5.7 per cent were foreign 
and colonial government debt securities, and 5.5 per cent were non-railway corporate equity 
securities.
18
 By 1903, the composition of the Stock Exchange Official List had changed 
substantially. The total nominal value was £8,833.8m and the composition of this was as 
follows: 44.1 per cent railway securities, 20.2 per cent foreign and colonial government debt 
securities, 19.8 per cent were non-railway equity and debenture securities, 15.8 per cent 
British government debt securities.
19
 Two major changes which had taken place over the 
period are worthy of note. First, non-railway corporate, and particularly equity, securities 
grew from being relatively unimportant to being a very important outlet for investors. 
Second, UK investors exported their capital and invested heavily in the debt of foreign 
governments and in the securities of foreign, and particularly American, railways.  
This study focuses on the first of these growth areas – corporate securities issued by 
new companies which were established following the liberalisation of incorporation law in 
the mid-1850s. Up until the end of our sample period, the vast majority of non-railway 
corporate securities were ordinary and preference shares. Because few non-railway 
companies issued debenture securities (i.e., corporate bonds) before the 1890s,
20
 the vast 
majority of securities issued by firms were ordinary and preference shares. 
In terms of the pool of investors, there were about 268,000 investors in government 
securities in 1851 and about one half of these were women.
21
 By way of contrast, very few 
women invested in early railway securities; in 1848, only 15.7 per cent of the shareholders in 
the Great Western Railway, one of the largest English railways at the time, were women.
22
 
7 
 
However, as railway securities became less risky and became regarded as high-quality 
investments which paid a steady dividend, women investors in railways were increasingly 
more common by the end of the century.
23
  
  In this paper, we analyse who invested in the shares of companies which came into 
existence in the second half of the nineteenth century. The investors in these companies may 
not be representative of the overall investor population because shares in these new ventures 
were relatively new to the market, had a limited track record and were potentially riskier than 
railway securities and Consols, and may not therefore have been attractive to some investors.    
 
3. Data and methodology 
The aim of this paper is to look at who financed the new companies which were created in the 
four decades after the 1862 Companies Act. Companies registered under the 1856 and 1862 
Companies Acts were required to lodge a yearly shareholder return with the Registrar of 
Companies. These returns were on a standardised form, Form E, which had columns for the 
shareholder’s name, number of shares owned, shareholder address, and occupation. Records 
were kept for both ordinary and preference shares. The returns of companies which were 
dissolved before 1970 were placed within the Companies Registration Office files at the 
National Archives at Kew (BT31 series) and the National Archives of Scotland (BT2 series).  
Notably, bank and insurance companies set up before 1862 and statutory companies 
established prior to that date (e.g., railways and other public utilities) are not in our sample 
unless they registered under the 1862 Act. The vast majority of UK railways were formed in 
the 1840s, and during the rest of the century there was consolidation of the railway industry. 
Any new railways which were formed would have incorporated under the Company Clauses 
Consolidation Act (1845), which was the legislation which governed the incorporation of 
public utilities which required powers of eminent domain. As this Act did not require the 
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reporting of shareholder returns to the Registrar of Companies, they did not report 
shareholder details on a Form E. The absence of railways from our sample, most of which 
were formed in the first half of the nineteenth century, means that we can focus on the 
specific aim of the paper, namely examining who financed the expansion of the market in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.   
We examined the collections of the BT2 and BT31 series for the public companies 
which were quoted either in the Course of the Exchange before 1870 or in the Investor’s 
Monthly Manual in 1870, 1885, and 1899. Numerous company files contained no ownership 
returns and most files had been extensively weeded to reduce their bulk.
24
  Thus, our strategy 
was to collect ownership returns for the 1850s, 1865, 1870, 1880, 1883, 1890, and 1900 or 
one year either side of these sample years if the return existed.  If a company had ownership 
returns which fell outside the selected sample years, we collected a return for each decade 
between 1860 and 1900, where available.   
After removing unintelligible returns and returns with missing pages, we inputted 
ownership returns for 488 companies and 890 company-years. Unfortunately, we found that 
the degree of occupational classification varied significantly.  At one extreme, 49 of our 
company-years reported shareholders occupations 100 per cent of the time, but at the other 
end of the spectrum, we found 56 company-years which recorded shareholder occupations 
less than 20 per cent of the time.  To create a robust sample of ownership characteristics, we 
focus only on those companies who had recorded shareholder occupational details 90 per cent 
of the time or more.  We imposed this cut-off point because once one goes beyond it, it 
becomes questionable if companies were recording occupational details in a systematic and 
accurate manner.  Indeed, of the 437 company-years excluded using this criterion, 47 per cent 
of shareholder occupation details, on average, were unreported. 
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The 10 per cent cut-off provided a sample of 293 companies, 453 company-years, 
172,473 shareholders, and circa £95 million of share capital.
25
 As there are some companies 
repeated across various years, the par value of unique companies is £59 million. To place this 
in context, the Investor’s Monthly Manual has been analysed in 1885. The total value of 
ordinary and preference shares issued by non-railways was £390 million. For comparison, the 
amount of debt issued by the British government was about £650 million, and the par value 
of securities issued by British railways was about £715 million.  
Within our sample, occupational details were missing for 3.9 per cent of individuals 
after the first phase of data entry. We therefore investigated each individual case using the 
original records to ascertain why characteristics had not been recorded.
26
  This sweep 
improved the overall completeness of our occupational detail to 99.1 per cent.  In terms of 
joint ownership of shares, where two or more individuals owned a share, we took the first 
named individual as the chief shareholder in the relationship and recorded their occupational 
status. The rationale for adopting this approach is that Table A of the 1862 Companies Act 
assigned voting power to the first named owner when stock was jointly held. As joint 
ownership was relatively uncommon within our sample, this approach should not bias our 
findings towards a particular socio-occupational grouping.   
There is an element of double counting in our sample of 172,473 shareholders.  First, 
we have more than one observation for some companies.  However, these are on average 15.9 
years apart, which gives time for the shareholder constituency to change.  Based on an 
analysis of the largest shareholders in each company, we found that about 50 per cent of them 
had disappeared by the time of the next ownership census. The second way in which we 
could have double counting is that an individual could be a shareholder in more than one 
company.  However, a sub-sample of the 1,158 largest shareholders (i.e, some of the 
wealthiest shareholders) reveals that less than 1.5 per cent of them held a substantial stake in 
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more than one of our sample companies, which suggests that we do not have much of a 
double-counting issue from this source.   
Table 1 shows the composition of our sample broken down by decade, industry, 
headquarters and the markets on which they were traded. We have also included a column in 
Table 1 which shows the number of companies reported in the Investor's Monthly Manual 
(IMM) for each category. All non-railway companies which had their ordinary or preference 
shares reported in the IMM at any point between 1869 and 1901 are included. This involved 
downloading the extensive IMM dataset from the Yale International Center for Finance, and 
then manually adding information on the industry, headquarters and markets of each firm. 
The results suggest that our sample is representative of the wider market. 
As can be seen from Table 1, our sample has a good spread of ownership censuses 
across the sample period – 23 per cent from the 1850s and 60s, 14 per cent from 1870s, 29 
per cent from 1880s, 24 per cent from 1890s, and 11 per cent from 1900 to 1902.  It also has 
companies from across different industrial sectors, with 23 per cent from banking, 8 per cent 
from mining, 8 per cent from the insurance sector, 7 per cent from iron, coal and steel, 8 per 
cent from finance, 5 per cent from utilities, 4 per cent from breweries, and the remaining 38 
per cent from a range of industries comprising docks, spinning and weaving, steamships, tea 
and coffee, telegraph, wagon, and miscellaneous industrial and commercial companies. 
Banks may be slightly over-represented, but there is a broad range of industries included in 
our sample which allows us to gain insights from across a wide variety of sectors. We also 
have a good spread based on location of company headquarters, with 42 per cent from 
London, 10 per cent from Lancashire, and 7 per cent from Yorkshire. Notably, there is a 
similar distribution based on where the securities were traded, with just over half of our 
sample being listed on one of the provincial stock exchanges.  
<< Insert Table 1 >> 
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We have also included a breakdown of how industry composition changed over time, 
in Table 2. The even spread of industries in each decade implies that our results are not 
driven by a changing composition of the sample. 
<< Insert Table 2 >> 
204 of our companies are domestic companies and the other 89 are defined as 
overseas companies, since their main business was based outside the UK even though they 
incorporated in the UK.  The whereabouts of a company’s main business was acquired from 
memoranda of association located in the BT31 and BT2 files, Burdett’s Official Intelligence, 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, and Stock Exchange Year-book.  
The companies in our sample were either floated on the stock market from scratch or 
were conversions of private companies. Consequently, compared to all non-railway 
companies listed in the IMM, the companies in our sample are relatively small, with less than 
three per cent of firms in the top decile of companies and the majority of companies being in 
the bottom 50 per cent of the size distribution.   
This study follows previous studies of share ownership in that we use the occupation 
reported in the ownership returns to assess the socio-occupational make-up of shareholder 
constituencies. There are, of course, limitations in doing so in that shareholders or company 
secretaries may overstate or misreport socio-occupational status. However, there would be 
little incentive for either party to do this in an era of limited liability.  
Occupations were classified into broad categories. Rentiers are subdivided into 
members of the nobility (as signified by titles), gentlemen and esquires. The terms 
‘gentleman’ and ‘esquire’ occur frequently in the shareholder lists. In the pre-modern era, 
gentlemen and esquires were members of the landed gentry who made up the second tier of 
the aristocracy, with esquires being above gentlemen in the hierarchy.
27
  However, by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the term gentleman or esquire was applied more 
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broadly.  Nevertheless, the usage of the term gentleman or esquire in the Victorian era 
usually signified that one was unoccupied and usually indicated an education at an elite 
public school.
28
 The 1891 Census gives some insights into these unoccupied males. In 
England and Wales, of approximately 7.5 million males over the age of 20
29
, there were 
about 450,000 unoccupied
30
. Of these, 192,611 were ‘Retired from business’, with a further 
20,980 categorised as ‘Pensioners’, probably with a military, church or medical background. 
96,593 were said to be ‘Living on Own Means’, although almost half of these were also over 
the age of 65.
31
 Another 136,949 were listed as ‘Other’. This suggests that those categorised 
as Gentleman and Esquires in the shareholder lists were probably either retired, or from the 
upper classes and did not need to work, both of which would imply they were rentiers, 
receiving most of their income from investments. 
 Businessmen and financiers are considered separately.  Businessmen are subdivided 
into three categories: manufacturers, merchants and retailers.  The main way in which we 
differentiated between these three was as follows: manufacturers produce goods or industrial 
inputs, merchants are mainly wholesalers or intermediaries, and retailers are involved in the 
sale of goods to the general public (e.g., tailor, draper and butcher). Financial occupations are 
divided into bankers, stockbrokers and other finance (e.g., actuaries and accountants). Bank 
clerks and agents working for financial institutions were not included in these categorisations, 
but were part of the white-collar categorisation. Institutional investors are categorised as 
either companies, or investment trusts.    
Women are subdivided so as to capture their need for income (widow and spinster) or 
whether they may have had more male input into their investment decisions (married 
women). The middle class is split into: professionals (e.g., architects, doctors, dentists, 
engineers, senior managers etc.), white-collar occupations (e.g., bank clerks, teachers, 
administrators etc.), legal professionals and clergymen. The working class is subdivided into 
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the skilled working class (e.g., joiners, painters, coopers, tanners, cabinet makers, cutlers, 
plumbers etc.) and unskilled working class (e.g., labourers and domestic servants etc.), 
although the former may in some cases be better classified as businessmen. We also examine 
some other groups separately, including politicians (mainly Members of Parliament) given 
their potential access to privileged information, those involved in agriculture who may have 
kept much of their capital in land, and members of the military who may have had a greater 
insight into foreign and colonial issues. 
 
4. Who invested? 
Table 3 contains the occupational composition of capital and shareholders in our sample. The 
first thing to note is that, unlike in the modern era, a very low proportion of capital is 
provided by companies or investment trusts. Investment trusts in the nineteenth century 
mainly invested in foreign and colonial debentures rather than in equity.
32
  However, several 
investment trusts held sizable equity stakes in a small number of companies in our sample. In 
terms of the 107 shareholders who are companies, 42 are banks and six are insurance 
companies.  Before it became illegal following the 1887 case of Trevor vs. Whitworth, some 
companies, mainly banks and insurance companies, held shares in their own company so as 
to make a market in them.
33
   
<<Insert Table 3>> 
Businessmen constitute 17.6 per cent of investors and provided 20.2 per cent of 
capital. These figures are of a similar order of magnitude as that found for British banks in 
this era.
34
  Financiers and financial professionals make up 3.1 per cent of investors and 
provided 4.3 per cent of capital. Thus, taken together, those with expertise and knowledge of 
business and investment provided a substantial amount of capital. 
14 
 
 We can see from Table 3 that 36.7 per cent of investors are rentiers and that they 
provide 44.8 per cent of capital.  Thus, the archetypal rentier provides a substantial amount of 
capital for the new businesses which emerge in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
This accords with the view that landowners and the gentry moved some of their assets into 
the stock market.
35
 Notably, studies of bank shareholders, which typically rely on very 
accurate reporting of socio-occupational status because of the unlimited liability of the banks, 
reveal that the proportion of gentlemen and esquires in the shareholder constituency was as 
high as 30 per cent, which is not that far below the 38.6 per cent proportion reported in Table 
3.
36
     
 Women constitute 20.3 per cent of investors and provide 10.9 per cent of capital.  
Notably, the mean share capital per investor is a lot lower for women than other categories, 
which may simply reflect lower wealth or caution on the part of female investors.
37
 As a 
point of comparison, Rutterford et al. find that for 1890-9, females constituted 25.3 per cent 
of the shareholdings and 10.8 per cent of the value in their national shareholding sample, 
which consists of larger and more prominent companies.
38
 Thus, it appears that females were 
just as important in the financing of smaller and less prominent companies as they were in 
financing large, established firms. Notably, the proportion of widows, spinsters and married 
women in the 1890-9 Rutterford et al. national shareholding sample is similar to that in Table 
3.
39
  
 In terms of our middle class groups, in total they constitute 14.5 per cent of 
shareholders and 11.0 per cent of capital.  The proportion of investors who are white collar 
and professionals is on a par with studies of bank shareholders in this period. Perhaps one 
surprising finding is that there are a lot of clergymen investing in the stock of these 
companies.  Clergymen, similar to women at the time, were believed to have small incomes 
and little experience of the financial world.
40
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 Notably, Table 3 reveals that the working classes were not well represented in the 
shareholding constituencies and provided only 0.5 per cent of capital. The mean amount of 
capital contributed by the two sub-groups of the working class is consistent with the intuition 
that these investors were the least wealthy of any other occupational groupings.  
 The final thing which we wish to highlight from Table 3 is that despite their small 
numbers, many politicians invested in our sample companies and provided 0.6 per cent of 
capital.  After the nobility, politicians have the highest mean capital per investor of any socio-
occupational group, perhaps indicating their wealth, but also the degree to which they 
invested in the equity capital of companies in the last half of the nineteenth century. 
 Table 4 shows the proportion of capital contributed by socio-occupational status 
across each decade of the sample period. The first thing to note is that the percentage of 
capital provided by businessmen (and merchants in particular) and financial professionals fell 
substantially as the century progressed. This fall could be explained by the fact that over time 
shares in these new limited companies were no longer perceived as being very risky and 
therefore they attracted more rentiers but fewer businessmen.   
<<Insert Table 4>> 
 Table 4 also reveals the growth in capital provided by rentiers over the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  The proportion of capital provided by these investors rises from 35.3 
per cent in the 1850s/60s to 44.1 per cent in the 1900s.  Women only provided 2.9 per cent of 
capital in the 1850s/60s, but by the 1900s, they provide 19.7 per cent. Thus, the main finding 
which emerges from Table 4 is that rentiers and women become important as the century 
progresses, whilst businessmen and financiers become less important.    
 The proportion of capital provided by the middle and working classes changes little 
over the century, but it is only with the arrival of low-denomination shares in the 1880s that 
the unskilled working class begin to invest in equity. It is also worthy to note that 
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participation of investment trusts in equity investment only really emerges in the 1890s and 
1900s.    
The decline in importance of businessmen could have resulted from either an absolute 
reduction in their involvement, or from other groups increasing at a relatively higher rate. To 
analyse this, Table 5 reports the absolute number of individuals in our sample in each 
occupational group by decade. The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that there was a relative 
decline in the number of businessmen, particularly merchants, whilst there was also a 
substantial increase in the number of women. 
<<Insert Table 5>> 
Since some of the findings in Table 4 may be driven by a cohort effect (i.e., the entry 
of new companies and industries), in Table 6 we look at the subset of companies where we 
have more than one ownership census to see if the changes over the century are due to new 
firms.  As can be seen from Table 6, there is a median of 15 years between ownership 
censuses.  There are three changes which are worth commenting upon and which suggest that 
the findings of Table 4 are not being wholly driven by a cohort effect.  First, there is a 
noticeable increase in the proportion of capital provided by women as well as in the number 
of women investors.  Second, the increase in women investors and capital provided by 
women is counterbalanced by a fall in the number of and capital provided by businessmen.  
Third, there is a slight increase in the number of and capital provided by the rentier classes.  
Notably, the increase in the number of shareholders in the rentier classes is counterbalanced 
by a fall in the number of shareholders from the middle classes. Overall, these results suggest 
that the increase of women and fall in businessmen witnessed in Table 4 is not being driven 
by a cohort effect, whereas the growth in the rentier classes is partially.   
<<Insert Table 6>> 
17 
 
Table 7 shows the proportion of capital contributed by socio-occupational groups by 
industry classification, which was obtained from the Stock Exchange Yearbook and Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence. A lot of the capital in mining companies, which were mainly 
foreign and colonial mines, was owned by gentlemen.  This could be because investing in 
these mines was attractive to high net-worth, but yet inexperienced, rentiers who were willing 
to take significant risks in the hope of making large returns.
41
  Businessmen contributed 
relatively little capital to mines and utilities compared to other sectors. Given that utilities 
were relatively safe investments, the low proportion of capital provided by businessmen may 
simply reflect their greater risk appetite. Women also avoided mines, but seemed to have 
preferred utilities and financials. Shares in these latter two sectors were relatively safe 
investments, which provided a steady dividend income, making them attractive to female 
rentiers.
42
     
<<Insert Table 7>> 
 Table 7 also shows the capital invested by different occupational groups in foreign 
and domestic companies.  Businessmen held a greater proportion of capital in domestic 
companies than they did in foreign: 25.0 versus 10.6 per cent.
43
 Gentlemen and esquires hold 
a greater proportion of capital in foreign companies versus domestic: 59.3 vs. 37.5 per cent. 
This is consistent with Davis and Huttenback’s finding that the elite pursued a different 
investment strategy to other groups and with Cain and Hopkin’s gentlemanly capitalists who 
placed their money overseas.
44
 Women had a slightly greater proportion of capital in 
domestic companies, which could suggest risk aversion or local bias on the part of females.
45
  
Companies and investment trusts mainly invested in foreign companies, which is consistent 
with the focus of most investment trusts on foreign fixed-income securities.  Those in the 
military also favoured foreign stocks, possibly reflecting experience of international 
conditions whilst based overseas. Overall, the picture which emerges is one of an investment 
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dichotomy – gentlemen rentiers invested in foreign companies, whereas businessmen and 
women rentiers provided finance for indigenous companies.   
 In 48 company-years in our sample, firms had both preference and ordinary shares.  
The proportions of capital invested by each socio-occupational group are in Table 8. Given 
that preference shares paid a fixed rate of dividend and were perceived as being safer, it is 
unsurprising that women had a higher proportion of capital invested in them than in ordinary 
shares. This finding supports that of Rutterford et al. who find that female shareholders had a 
greater propensity to invest in preference rather than ordinary shares.
46
 The reverse is the case 
for businessmen, which might indicate a greater risk appetite or less of a need for a fixed 
income.  Notably, rentiers from the rentier class had roughly the same proportion of capital in 
each type of equity security.     
<<Insert Table 8>> 
 In an attempt to see if certain occupational groups have a preference for the equities 
of companies headquartered and traded in London versus those which were headquartered 
and traded in the various regional markets,
47
 we obtained information on the location of 
companies’ headquarters from the Stock Exchange Yearbook and Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence. These two sources as well as the Investor’s Monthly Manual were used to 
identify the stock markets where shares were chiefly dealt.  As some of the companies in our 
sample were established prior to the publication of the first Stock Exchange Yearbook in 
1875, we do not have this information for some companies in our sample. 
 The first thing to note from Table 9 is that shares in some companies were traded on 
the London Stock Exchange as well as on provincial stock exchanges.
48
  We also see that 
gentlemen and esquires provided a smaller proportion of capital for regional companies than 
they did for London-headquartered companies.  This finding is consistent with the fact that 
all foreign companies in our sample listed in London.  However, gentlemanly capitalists still 
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provided 27.2 per cent of capital to regional companies which listed only on provincial stock 
exchanges.   
 <<Insert Table 9>> 
Women provided a slightly greater proportion of capital to regional companies than 
they did to London-headquartered companies.  Businessmen, particularly manufacturers, 
provided substantially smaller proportions of capital to London-headquartered compared to 
regional companies. Thus, these findings suggest something of another investment dichotomy 
– rentiers invested in London-based companies whereas businessmen provided finance for 
provincial companies. 
 
5. Clientele effects – hypotheses, empirical strategy and data 
We now move on to test various hypotheses about whether certain types of individual had 
preferences for investing in certain types of shares.  In particular, we consider company 
characteristics (i.e., firm size, firm age, board size and composition, foreign vs domestic firm, 
and provincial vs London firms) and share characteristics (i.e., marketability, dividends, risk, 
uncalled capital, and share denomination). We use six broad categories of shareholders: 
businessmen, rentiers, women, finance, the middle classes, and institutional investors (i.e., 
companies and investment trusts).  
 According to Jefferys, during the era covered in this paper, a group of middle-class 
investors or rentiers emerged who cared only about a stock’s marketability, risk, and 
dividend.
49
  We test this hypothesis by looking at whether middle-class and women investors 
tended to invest in companies which had marketable shares, were relatively safe, and paid a 
dividend. In particular, preference shares may have been attractive to these types of 
investors.
50
 Jefferys also suggests that these investors were put off by high share 
denominations and uncalled capital.
51
 Uncalled capital, whereby a portion of a share’s 
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nominal value was unpaid and could be called up at the discretion of firm managers, would 
have been unattractive to risk-averse investors such as women and the moderately-wealthy 
middle classes.
52
 High share denominations were disliked by the same group of investors 
because they were perceived to be less marketable and made portfolio diversification more 
difficult. Governance may have played a role in attracting certain types of investors, with 
larger boards and boards containing members of the nobility assuring inexperienced investors 
from the middle classes as to the quality of the company.
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 In order to test the above hypotheses, we regress company and share characteristics on 
to the proportion of capital invested by each of these six broad investor groups as well as the 
proportion of investors from each group.  In terms of company characteristics, we examine 
whether (a) company age; (b) size; (c) being a family firm; (d) being a foreign firm; (e) size 
and composition of the board determine the proportion of capital invested by a shareholder 
group or the proportion of the shareholder constituency from a particular shareholder group.  
In terms of share characteristics, we examine the following determinants: (a) whether a firm 
is a dividend payer or not; (b) a firm’s dividend yield as a rough proxy for risk; (c) 
marketability of shares as proxied firstly by the number of times over the past year that there 
was a change in the end-of-month share price, which suggests that trading occurred
54
, and 
secondly by the number of markets where shares were listed; (d) whether a share was a 
preference share; (e)  the amount of uncalled capital attached to a share; and (f) a share’s 
denomination as measured by its par value. The data sources for and definitions of these 
variables can be found in Appendix Table 1.  
 We have four industry dummy variables in our regressions, and control variables for 
the year in which the ownership census was taken and the total number of shareholders in a 
firm.  As the ownership records we use for our sample all come from companies which by 
definition ceased to exist, we control for any potential biases by having two variables which 
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capture the ultimate fate of a firm - whether a firm merged (usually a non-performance reason 
for a firm’s cessation) and whether a firm was wound up by a court (a performance reason for 
a firm’s cessation).  We also control for the location of a firm’s head office by having three 
binary variables for London, Lancashire, and Yorkshire, which are the most common 
locations for headquarters. In addition, we have a control variable which is the distance 
between the company’s headquarters and the chief market where its shares are dealt. This 
variable acts as a proxy for whether a company is a local firm with shareholders located in 
the area. The data sources for and definitions of all of these variables can be found in 
Appendix Table 1. 
 As some firms had both preference and ordinary shares, we consider each share class 
as a separate observation in our regression analysis.  In other words, a preference share and 
an ordinary share from the same company enter our regressions individually. Table 10 
contains the summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables. In terms of our 
key independent variables, we note the following.  First, the mean company age (Age) is 
17.58 years and total company par value (Size) is £232,600.  Second, 29 per cent of the 
equities in the sample are those of foreign firms, whereas 18 per cent are those of family 
firms. Third, 84 per cent of equities pay a dividend (DivPayer) and the median dividend yield 
(DivYield) of 5.71 per cent is high.  Fourth, the median of our Liquidity variable is 0.42, 
which means that the end-of-month share price for the median equity changed 42 per cent of 
the months over the previous year, suggesting that many of our equities were illiquid.  This is 
further evidenced by the fact that the median of our NumMarkets variable is one, which 
means that the median equity in our sample only traded on one stock market.  Fifth, in terms 
of share denomination (ShareParValue) the mean is £10.76 and in terms of uncalled capital 
(ShareUncalled) the average is £13.69.  Sixth, as indicated by the statistics for the Preference 
variable, nine per cent of the equities in the sample are preference shares. Seventh, the 
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average number of directors in a firm was 6.13, and 36 per cent of firms had at least one 
director who was a member of the nobility. 
<<Insert Table 10>> 
6. Clientele effects – results 
To analyse the determinants of how much capital was contributed by each occupational 
group, we use Tobit regressions. This is because the dependent variable cannot be less than 
zero. We have controlled for heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors. We have also 
ensured that multicollinearity is not an issue by examining the variance inflation factors of 
the independent variables. The highest is just 3.19, which is well below the level of 10, where 
concerns would be raised. 
We have also checked the robustness of our results by examining various 
specifications of the regressions. One approach uses a relatively small number of independent 
variables, and keeps the number of observations high. The regressions are then repeated using 
a larger number of variables, but the number of observations drops as we do not have this 
data for all firms. Despite the inclusion of additional variables, and the change in the size of 
the sample, the results remain very similar, suggesting that they are robust. 
The regression results for the rentiers, women and the middle classes are in Table 11, 
with the results for businessmen, institutions and financiers in Table 12.  In both these tables, 
the proportions of capital contributed by each of the socio-occupational groups are the 
dependent variables.  
<<Insert Tables 11 and 12>> 
We find that rentiers preferred to invest in large firms, and avoided family firms, 
suggesting that they were not major providers of capital for small, regional enterprises. There 
is some suggestion of a greater tendency to invest in foreign securities, but this does not 
remain significant when controlling for the financial characteristics of the assets. This adds 
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some context to the debate on why so much capital was exported abroad. It was not 
necessarily a preference for foreign securities, it was just the underlying characteristics of the 
assets. For example, they invested more in mines, many of which were based abroad. 
Women took a different approach to investing, showing a strong pattern of risk-
aversion. They focused on older, established companies, which were dividend payers. The 
investments tended to have a lower dividend yield, again reflecting lower risk, and there was 
a greater propensity to invest in preference shares. They also avoided companies with high 
amounts of uncalled capital, limiting their exposure to future calls on capital. They may have 
been more reluctant to invest in foreign firms, but again the significance disappears when 
controlling for the financial characteristics of the assets. The marketability of shares does not 
seem to have been a consideration for women, possibly because they were the stereotypical 
buy-and-hold investors and thus cared less about stock liquidity.
55
 Therefore, the Jefferys 
hypothesis that such investors preferred fully-paid and marketable stocks is not fully 
supported in that although women investors preferred fully-paid shares, they had no 
preferences with regards to stock marketability.
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The middle classes also had a tendency to invest in preference shares, and avoided 
foreign firms and mines. They also avoided family firms, and focused more on businesses 
which had more directors, possibly regarding them as having better governance. Perhaps 
surprisingly, they also tended to invest in smaller companies. In addition, there is no support 
for Jeffery’s contention that women and middle class investors preferred low denomination 
stocks. 
Businessmen acted as the venture capitalists of the era. They invested in young, 
domestic, family firms, in some cases probably being the founders themselves. They avoided 
companies with nobility on the board of directors, possibly reflecting their scepticism about 
how much value they would add to the company. 
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Financial professionals may be regarded as the speculators of the period. They 
invested in highly liquid stocks, which they could buy and sell quickly. They invested more 
in foreign firms, and avoided preference shares, reflecting a greater willingness to embrace 
risk in the hope of making higher returns. 
Institutions also tended to focus on foreign companies, reflecting the initial 
concentration of investment trusts on foreign and colonial investments
57
. This focus may 
have been a deliberate marketing technique. As noted already, women, the middle classes and 
businessmen were reluctant to invest directly in foreign companies. They may have found 
using an investment trust to be appealing, as they may have believed the trust managers could 
have used professional expertise to pick the best international investments.   
Thus far, we have been looking at the determinants of the proportion of capital 
invested by various socio-occupational groups.  We have also repeated the regressions using 
the proportion of shareholders in each company, rather than the proportion of capital that they 
have contributed. This ensures that the results are not being dominated by a small number of 
blockholders. As shown in Table 13, the results remain similar to the main results. This is not 
necessarily surprising given that, apart from institutional investors, there is a close correlation 
between the number of investors and the proportion invested (see Table 3). However, there 
are a few notable differences.  There are significant and positive coefficients suggesting that 
rentiers were indeed more likely to invest in foreign and London-based firms. Also, if a firm 
was a dividend payer, fewer from the middle class invested in it. 
<<Insert Table 13>> 
 The overall picture which emerges from our regression analysis is as follows. The 
rentier classes exhibited a preference for large firms.  Women investors tended to focus more 
on assets which were relatively safe – they shunned young and non-dividend-paying firms as 
well as mining companies, shares with uncalled capital, and shares with a high dividend 
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yield. The middle classes had a proclivity for preference shares and domestic firms. 
Businessmen focused on young, domestic, family firms, suggesting that they invested in what 
they knew and in what they had information on through their business networks. In contrast, 
financiers and institutional investors favoured foreign securities. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has considered who invested in equities during the substantial expansion of the 
British equity market in the five decades following the liberalisation of incorporation law in 
the mid-1850s, with a focus on those firms which had been formed during this period. We 
find that rentiers were the largest providers of capital, with businessmen, women and the 
middle classes also investing substantial amounts. Businessmen became less important over 
time, whilst women contributed greater proportions. 
There were significant differences in investment styles between the groups. Rentiers 
focused on large firms, whereas businessmen invested primarily in young, regional, family 
firms. Women and the middle classes tended towards low-risk investments, whereas 
financiers sought highly liquid stocks which they could trade quickly, and investment trusts 
were more attracted to foreign investments. 
These results raise issues about whether managers of firms understood their 
shareholder clienteles, and pursued particular policies as a result. For example, did they 
maintain their dividend policies to placate those shareholders who wanted a steady income? 
Did they issue preference shares or bonds in order to appeal to risk-averse investors, and can 
this explain the growth in these asset classes over time? Similarly, did the investment trust 
industry gain popularity because it opened up international investment to clienteles who had 
traditionally avoided investing directly in foreign stocks? Future research on the growth of 
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these asset classes may reveal interesting connections between ownership, governance, and 
financial innovation. 
 
  
27 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of sample companies 
 Number of 
Companies 
in IMM 
Sample 
 
Number of 
Companies 
Number of 
Securities 
Number of 
Shareholdings 
Total Par Value 
(£m) 
 Panel A: Decade of observation 
1850s and 1860s 661 103 107 27,606 13.6 
1870 1,079 64 68 24,115 14.0 
1880 1,390 130 148 50,521 27.7 
1890 1,767 107 142 53,500 25.3 
1900 1,441 49 66 33,549 14.7 
Total 2,725 453 531 189,291 95.3 
 Panel B: Industry 
Banks 230 103 109 63,445 28.8 
Insurance 142 35 35 12,072 4.2 
Finance 262 37 39 18,173 7.2 
Iron, Coal & Steel 161 30 38 8,469 11.0 
Utility 179 22 25 6,196 3.3 
Mines 355 34 39 17,490 10.4 
Breweries 135 20 31 7,396 4.9 
Other 1,261 172 215 56,050 25.6 
Total 2,725 453 531 189,291 95.3 
 Panel C: Company headquarters 
London 1,393 217 266 105,321 54.3 
Lancashire 240 58 70 17,780 13.4 
Yorkshire 121 33 35 11,078 5.7 
Other 521 95 110 43,973 15.5 
Unknown 450 50 50 11,139 6.4 
Total 2,725 453 531 189,291 95.3 
 Panel D: Stock market listings 
London 1,591 240 294 110,732 58.1 
Lancashire 291 78 101 32,969 23.0 
Yorkshire 125 37 44 18,503 12.2 
Other 560 100 119 56,899 21.9 
Unknown 432 66 66 18,117 7.6 
Sources: Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) and see text 
Notes: Stock market listings sum to more than total number of companies because one company could 
list on multiple exchanges. IMM data covers the period from 1869 to 1901, so the average number of 
companies in IMM for 1850s and 1860s only refers to 1869, and for 1900s only refers to 1900 to 1901. 
IMM data refers to non-railway companies which had issued either ordinary shares and/or preference 
shares.  
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Table 2. Number of sample companies by Industry and Decade 
 
1850s and 
1860s 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
      
 
Banks 17 16 37 21 12 103 
Insurance 8 7 9 9 2 35 
Finance 11 8 11 4 3 37 
Iron, Coal & Steel 4 5 9 9 3 30 
Utility 7 2 5 4 4 22 
Mines 8 4 9 9 4 34 
Breweries 1 4 5 7 3 20 
Other 47 18 45 44 18 172 
       
Total 103 64 130 107 49 453 
Sources: See text. 
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Table 3. Occupational composition of capital and shareholders 
 
Capital 
 
 
(£) 
Proportion 
of capital 
 
(%) 
Number of 
investors 
Proportion of 
investors 
 
(%) 
Mean per 
investor  
 
(£) 
Business-Manufacturing 5,674,462 6.0 8,616 5.0 622 
Business-Merchant 11,700,000 12.3 14,408 8.4 756 
Business-Retail 1,858,279 1.9 7,262 4.2 246 
Businessmen 19,232,741 20.2 30,286 17.6 596 
Company 360,897 0.4 107 0.1 3,289 
Investment trust 706,589 0.7 89 0.1 7,858 
Institutional 1,067,486 1.1 196 0.1 5,364 
Finance-Banker 2,093,118 2.2 1,613 0.9 1,234 
Finance-Other Finance 642,596 0.7 1,892 1.1 327 
Finance-Stockbroker 1,395,550 1.5 1,833 1.1 699 
Financiers 4,131,264 4.3 5,338 3.1 729 
Middle-Legal Profession 3,066,400 3.2 6,655 3.9 437 
Middle-Clergy 1,577,757 1.7 4,160 2.4 348 
Middle-Professional 3,970,541 4.2 7,180 4.2 516 
Middle-White Collar 1,907,744 2.0 6,957 4.0 256 
Middle Classes 10,522,442 11.0 24,951 14.5 395 
Rentier-Esquire 14,600,000 15.3 16,612 9.6 782 
Rentier-Gentleman 26,600,000 27.9 46,122 26.7 546 
Rentier-Nobility 1,496,633 1.6 598 0.3 2,390 
Rentiers 42,696,633 44.8 63,332 36.7 626 
Women-Married 1,545,565 1.6 5,647 3.3 244 
Women-Spinster 5,015,968 5.3 18,564 10.8 258 
Women-Widow 3,867,379 4.1 10,743 6.2 340 
Women 10,428,912 10.9 34,954 20.3 281 
Working-Skilled 384,080 0.4 1,629 0.9 228 
Working-Unskilled 51,160 0.1 512 0.3 98 
Working Classes 435,240 0.5 2,141 1.2 197 
Politician 536,375 0.6 222 0.1 2,051 
Agriculture 1,162,674 1.2 4,960 2.9 230 
Military 2,185,713 2.3 3,418 2.0 598 
Executor / Trust 1,626,188 1.7 1,143 0.7 1,373 
Unknown (males) 1,293,380 1.4 1,531 0.9 785 
      Total 95,319,047 100.0 172,473 100.0 517 
      
No. of company-years 443 443 419 419 419 
No. of securities 512 512 471 471 471 
      Sources: See text. 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.  Total capital could not be calculated for a small number of 
companies where par value was not stated. The number of investors is from a slightly smaller sample of 
company-years because we were unable to match up shareholders in some companies who held both preference 
and ordinary shares.   
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Table 4.  Percentage of capital contributed by each occupational group, by decade 
 
1850s and 
1860s 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 
Business-Manufacturing 9.4 4.0 5.9 5.9 4.8 
Business-Merchant 26.5 12.7 10.7 9.5 6.3 
Business-Retail 2.1 1.6 2.1 1.8 2.1 
Businessmen 38.1 18.3 18.8 17.2 13.1 
Company 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 
Investment trust 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.0 2.2 
Institutional 0.8 0.1 0.6 1.2 3.2 
Finance-Banker 2.4 5.2 2.0 0.9 1.7 
Finance-Other Finance 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Finance-Stockbroker 3.3 2.0 1.5 0.6 0.7 
Financiers 6.9 7.7 4.2 2.1 3.0 
Middle-Legal Profession 3.9 2.4 2.9 4.2 2.2 
Middle-Clergy 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Middle-Professional 3.6 3.4 4.7 4.2 4.4 
Middle-White Collar 2.9 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.7 
Middle Classes 11.5 9.6 11.5 11.7 9.9 
Rentier-Esquire 13.1 22.9 18.6 11.8 9.9 
Rentier-Gentleman 21.7 27.3 28.4 29.9 30.1 
Rentier-Nobility 0.5 1.0 0.9 1.7 4.1 
Rentiers 35.3 51.1 47.9 43.5 44.1 
Women-Married 0.0 0.2 1.1 2.3 4.1 
Women-Spinster 1.8 4.1 4.4 5.8 10.2 
Women-Widow 1.1 3.1 4.3 5.1 5.4 
Women 2.9 7.4 9.9 13.3 19.7 
Working-Skilled 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Working-Unskilled 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Working Classes 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Politician 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.7 
Agriculture 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.2 1.5 
Military 2.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.8 
Executor / Trust 0.2 0.8 0.8 4.7 0.4 
Unknown (males) 1.1 0.7 1.3 2.0 1.1 
      Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
      No. of company-years 99 63 126 106 49 
No. of securities 102 66 140 138 66 
      Sources: See text 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.  The number of securities differs from the number of company-
years because some companies issued both ordinary and preference shares. There are a few married women who 
appear to own shares in the 1870s, which was before the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 
(45 & 46 Vict. c.75). It is likely that these women had recently become widows or had just been married.  
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Table 5.        Number and percentage of shareholders by each occupational group, by decade 
  N % N %  N %  N %  N %  
 
1850s and 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 
Business-
Manufacturing 
1,503 5.6 1,008 4.5 2,638 5.8 2,128 4.6 1,339 4.3 
Business-
Merchant 
4,410 16.5 2,035 9.0 3,705 8.1 2,890 6.2 1,368 4.4 
Business-Retail 1,111 4.2 842 3.7 2,195 4.8 1,848 4.0 1,266 4.1 
Businessmen 7,024 26.2 3,885 17.2 8,538 18.8 6,866 14.8 3,973 12.7 
Company 17 0.1 6 0.0 18 0.0 37 0.1 29 0.1 
Investment trust 6 0.0 1 0.0 9 0.0 29 0.1 44 0.1 
Institutional 23 0.1 7 0.0 27 0.1 66 0.1 73 0.2 
Finance-Banker 362 1.4 277 1.2 448 1.0 303 0.7 223 0.7 
Finance-Other 
Finance 
356 1.3 192 0.9 539 1.2 488 1.1 317 1.0 
Finance-
Stockbroker 
592 2.2 272 1.2 526 1.2 268 0.6 175 0.6 
Financiers 1,310 4.9 741 3.3 1,513 3.3 1,059 2.3 715 2.3 
Middle-Legal 
Profession 
1,546 5.8 571 2.5 1,630 3.6 2,272 4.9 636 2.0 
Middle-Clergy 490 1.8 559 2.5 1,158 2.5 1,197 2.6 756 2.4 
Middle-
Professional 
1,170 4.4 888 3.9 2,052 4.5 1,834 4.0 1,236 4.0 
Middle-White 
Collar 
1,316 4.9 810 3.6 1,997 4.4 1,758 3.8 1,076 3.4 
Middle Classes 4,522 16.9 2,828 12.5 6,837 15.0 7,061 15.2 3,704 11.9 
Rentier-Esquire 2,357 8.8 4,172 18.5 4,920 10.8 3,112 6.7 2,051 6.6 
Rentier-
Gentleman 
8,460 31.6 6,098 27.0 10,934 24.0 11,742 25.3 8,888 28.5 
Rentier-Nobility 58 0.2 85 0.4 141 0.3 197 0.4 117 0.4 
Rentiers 10,875 40.6 10,355 45.9 15,995 35.1 15,051 32.4 11,056 35.4 
Women-Married 44 0.2 153 0.7 789 1.7 2,584 5.6 2,077 6.7 
Women-Spinster 987 3.7 2,082 9.2 4,681 10.3 6,380 13.7 4,434 14.2 
Women-Widow 458 1.7 1,026 4.5 2,895 6.4 3,671 7.9 2,693 8.6 
Women 1,489 5.6 3,261 14.4 8,365 18.4 12,635 27.2 9,204 29.5 
Working-Skilled 233 0.9 158 0.7 476 1.0 391 0.8 371 1.2 
Working-
Unskilled 
57 0.2 18 0.1 263 0.6 108 0.2 66 0.2 
Working Classes 290 1.1 176 0.8 739 1.6 499 1.1 437 1.4 
Politician 47 0.2 39 0.2 67 0.1 42 0.1 27 0.1 
Agriculture 271 1.0 487 2.2 1,601 3.5 1,443 3.1 1,158 3.7 
Military 537 2.0 509 2.3 991 2.2 893 1.9 488 1.6 
Executor / Trust 72 0.3 104 0.5 311 0.7 438 0.9 218 0.7 
Unknown (males) 308 1.2 190 0.8 526 1.2 357 0.8 150 0.5 
           
Total 26,768 100.0 22,582 100.0 45,510 100.0 46,410 100.0 31,203 100.0 
           
No. of company-
years 
99 
 
63 
 
126 
 
106 
 
49 
 
No. of securities 102 
 
66 
 
140 
 
138 
 
66 
 
Sources: See text 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.  The number of securities differs from the number of company-
years because some companies issued both ordinary and preference shares. There are a few married women who 
appear to own shares in the 1870s, which was before the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 
(45 & 46 Vict. c.75). It is likely that these women had recently become widows or had just been married.  
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Table 6. Change in shareholder constituencies 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
      Change in capital provided (%)      
Businessmen -6.9 15.2 -53.0 -5.1 67.9 
Institutional investors 0.3 2.6 -9.8 0.0 21.9 
Finance -1.3 6.5 -29.5 -0.2 34.9 
Middle class -1.0 7.7 -26.0 -0.3 26.9 
Rentiers 2.2 17.8 -75.1 3.0 48.5 
Women 7.0 7.5 -6.8 5.0 38.6 
Working class -0.1 1.3 -7.0 0.0 4.6 
      
Change in number of shareholders (%)     
Businessmen -6.9 10.1 -35.7 -6.4 36.3 
Institutional investors 0.0 0.3 -1.3 0.0 1.8 
Finance -1.2 2.7 -13.5 -0.8 5.0 
Middle class -2.7 7.2 -34.0 -2.1 14.6 
Rentiers 1.9 13.5 -37.5 1.1 39.4 
Women 9.0 8.0 -6.9 7.5 29.8 
Working class -0.4 1.8 -8.5 0.0 4.5 
      
Years between ownership censuses 15.9 8.9 4.0 15.0 44.0 
      Sources: See text 
Notes: There are 126 equities where we have more than one ownership census. The Businessmen category 
consists of manufacturers, merchants and retailers. Institutional investors are companies and investment trusts.  
Finance includes bankers, stockbrokers and other financial professionals. Middle class includes clergy, legal 
professionals, professionals and white-collar employees. Rentier class consists of army and naval officers, 
esquires, gentlemen and members of the nobility.  The Women category consists of married women, spinsters 
and widows.  The Working class category consists of the skilled and unskilled working class. All values refer to 
the data used in the analysis, meaning after it has been winsorized. 
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Table 7.  Proportion of capital contributed by each occupational group, by industry and 
foreign vs. domestic 
 
Breweries Financial Mines Utilities Other Foreign Domestic 
      
  
Business-Manufacturing 11.4 7.2 0.4 2.2 5.8 0.9 8.5 
Business-Merchant 6.6 13.4 5.5 8.8 14.1 9.2 13.9 
Business-Retail 1.2 2.9 0.2 1.2 1.5 0.5 2.7 
Businessmen 19.2 23.5 6.1 12.3 21.4 10.6 25.0 
Company 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 
Investment trust 5.3 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.9 0.1 
Institutional 6.3 0.2 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.8 0.3 
Finance-Banker 1.3 2.9 0.9 1.5 1.9 3.5 1.5 
Finance-Other Finance 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 
Finance-Stockbroker 0.4 1.0 1.1 0.5 2.3 1.4 1.5 
Financiers 2.1 4.6 2.3 2.3 5.1 5.3 3.8 
Middle-Legal Profession 4.2 3.8 1.4 2.3 3.1 2.0 3.8 
Middle-Clergy 0.9 2.1 0.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 
Middle-Professional 4.4 3.6 1.4 4.6 5.5 2.8 4.8 
Middle-White Collar 1.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.2 2.4 
Middle Classes 10.5 11.6 5.1 10.3 12.2 7.7 12.7 
Rentier-Esquire 16.7 18.8 18.9 26.1 9.3 21.6 12.1 
Rentier-Gentleman 24.6 20.4 57.1 25.7 28.4 36.2 23.8 
Rentier-Nobility 2.1 0.8 1.2 2.0 2.4 1.5 1.6 
Rentiers 43.4 40.1 77.1 53.8 40.1 59.3 37.5 
Women-Married 1.8 1.3 1.0 2.1 2.1 1.4 1.7 
Women-Spinster 3.0 6.2 2.1 6.0 5.4 3.3 6.2 
Women-Widow 3.9 5.4 1.6 4.5 3.3 3.0 4.6 
Women 8.7 12.8 4.6 12.6 10.8 7.8 12.5 
Working-Skilled 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 
Working-Unskilled 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Working Classes 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 
Politician 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.3 
Agriculture 0.1 2.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 1.7 
Military 5.9 2.3 1.6 3.6 1.9 3.5 1.7 
Executor / Trust 0.0 0.7 0.9 2.0 3.2 0.8 2.2 
Unknown (males) 3.5 0.7 0.5 1.1 2.0 0.9 1.6 
      
  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
      
  
No. of company-years 20 170 34 21 198 125 318 
No. of securities 31 177 39 22 243 148 364 
        
Sources: See text 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.  The number of equities differs from the number of company-
years because some companies issued both ordinary and preference shares. A foreign company is defined as 
such if its headquarters or operations were located outside of the UK.  
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Table 8.  Proportion of capital invested in ordinary vs preference shares, for those 
companies which had issued both 
 
Ordinary shares Preference shares 
   
Business-Manufacturing 10.0 7.9 
Business-Merchant 9.1 5.8 
Business-Retail 1.7 1.6 
Businessmen 20.8 15.3 
Company 0.3 0.5 
Investment trust 1.5 2.3 
Institutional 1.8 2.8 
Finance-Banker 2.1 1.5 
Finance-Other Finance 0.8 0.4 
Finance-Stockbroker 1.9 0.5 
Financiers 4.9 2.4 
Middle-Legal Profession 3.2 3.1 
Middle-Clergy 1.2 1.6 
Middle-Professional 4.8 5.4 
Middle-White Collar 1.6 2.9 
Middle Classes 10.8 13.0 
Rentier-Esquire 8.2 11.1 
Rentier-Gentleman 35.3 33.2 
Rentier-Nobility 1.5 1.0 
Rentiers 45.0 45.4 
Women-Married 2.7 3.0 
Women-Spinster 3.3 4.7 
Women-Widow 3.5 5.3 
Women 9.5 13.0 
Working-Skilled 0.2 0.3 
Working-Unskilled 0.0 0.0 
Working Classes 0.2 0.3 
Politician 0.3 0.4 
Agriculture 0.2 0.4 
Military 2.6 4.1 
Executor / Trust 0.8 0.2 
Unknown (male) 3.2 2.8 
   Total 100.0 100.0 
   Companies 48 48 
Par Value (£) 7,894,606 5,029,581 
   
Sources: See text 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.   
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Table 9.  Proportion of capital contributed by each occupational group, by location of 
head office and stock-market listing 
Head Office: London  Regional 
Stock Exchanges: 
London 
only 
London and 
provincial 
 
London 
only 
London and 
provincial 
Provincial 
only 
Business-Manufacturing 1.9 2.7  17.1 7.9 11.1 
Business-Merchant 8.6 10.3  9.6 23.1 12.5 
Business-Retail 1.2 0.6  0.7 2.5 3.9 
Businessmen 11.7 13.7  27.3 33.5 27.5 
Company 0.3 0.2  0.0 0.0 0.2 
Investment trust 1.5 1.6  0.1 0.3 0.0 
Institutional 1.9 1.7  0.1 0.3 0.2 
Finance-Banker 1.3 2.7  2.2 3.8 1.7 
Finance-Other Finance 0.4 0.6  0.1 1.8 0.9 
Finance-Stockbroker 1.0 1.7  0.0 3.8 1.3 
Financiers 2.7 5.0  2.3 9.3 3.9 
Middle-Legal Profession 3.7 2.1  7.0 2.9 3.3 
Middle-Clergy 2.1 1.5  1.1 1.3 1.6 
Middle-Professional 2.8 6.3  2.4 3.6 5.2 
Middle-White Collar 1.5 1.4  0.4 2.0 2.9 
Middle Classes 10.2 11.4  10.9 9.8 13.0 
Rentier-Esquire 21.3 19.9  18.6 19.0 5.6 
Rentier-Gentleman 33.8 32.0  22.5 16.3 18.8 
Rentier-Nobility 1.3 1.6  1.7 0.5 2.8 
Rentiers 56.5 53.5  42.8 35.8 27.2 
Women-Married 1.8 1.7  1.8 1.3 2.3 
Women-Spinster 4.5 3.4  9.9 2.5 8.8 
Women-Widow 4.0 3.1  1.4 4.4 5.5 
Women 10.3 8.1  13.0 8.2 16.7 
Working-Skilled 0.2 0.2  0.2 0.3 0.8 
Working-Unskilled 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.1 
Working Classes 0.2 0.3  0.2 0.3 0.9 
Politician 0.7 1.2  0.1 0.3 0.2 
Agriculture 0.4 0.3  0.1 0.4 3.0 
Military 3.6 2.3  2.1 0.8 1.1 
Executor / Trust 0.9 0.8  0.4 0.6 4.4 
Unknown (male) 1.0 1.7  0.7 0.5 2.0 
   
 
   Total 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
 
   No. of company-years 130 36  9 11 126 
No. of securities 159 48  11 15 146 
       
Sources: See text 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.  The number of securities differs from the number of company-
years because some companies issued both ordinary and preference shares.  
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Table 10.  Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
 
N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
       BusinessProp 523 24.9% 21.1% 0.0% 19.2% 84.4% 
InstitutionProp 523 0.7% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 25.7% 
FinanceProp 523 4.6% 7.1% 0.0% 2.4% 42.2% 
RentierProp 523 38.1% 23.1% 0.0% 34.6% 93.8% 
MiddleProp 523 13.3% 9.7% 0.1% 11.4% 58.2% 
WomenProp 523 10.2% 9.4% 0.0% 7.6% 41.0% 
BusinessNum 523 21.8% 17.8% 0.0% 17.8% 76.7% 
InstitutionNum 523 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
FinanceNum 523 3.8% 3.9% 0.0% 2.8% 25.7% 
RentierNum 523 34.1% 21.4% 0.0% 30.6% 89.2% 
MiddleNum 523 15.7% 9.2% 1.5% 14.0% 65.2% 
WomenNum 523 16.9% 12.1% 0.0% 15.4% 47.2% 
Age 471 17.58 17.90 0.00 11.00 72.00 
CourtWoundup 523 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DirectorsNobility 370 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DivPayer 272 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00 
DivYield 272 6.03 4.18 0.00 5.71 21.82 
FamilyFirm 375 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ForeignFirm 523 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
HeadLanc 423 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 
HeadLondon 423 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
HeadYork 423 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryBreweries 523 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryFinancial 523 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryMines 523 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 
IndustryUtility 523 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Liquidity 267 0.47 0.28 0.00 0.42 1.00 
LocalMiles 387 10.97 44.04 0.00 0.00 498.00 
Merged 523 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NumDirectors 370 6.13 2.68 3.00 6.00 23.00 
NumMarkets 388 1.33 0.77 1.00 1.00 6.00 
NumShareholders 523 421.75 425.24 71.00 294.00 3,184.00 
OwnershipDate 523 1883 12.83 1856 1884 1901 
Preference 523 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ShareParValue 512 10.76 10.26 0.55 10.00 50.00 
ShareUncalled 510 13.69 23.42 0.00 2.00 97.50 
Size (£000s) 511 232.60 268.46 20.00 150.00 1,587.44 
Sources: See text 
Notes: See text for definitions of occupations.  These descriptive statistics are on a per security basis.  In other 
words, if a firm has ordinary and preference shares, they are considered as separate investments. All values refer 
to the data used in the analysis, meaning after it has been winsorized.  
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Table 11.  Tobit regressions showing determinants of proportion of capital held by 
rentiers, women and middle classes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RentierProp RentierProp WomenProp WomenProp MiddleProp MiddleProp 
       
Age 0.000 -0.002* 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.051*** 0.082*** -0.006 -0.015 -0.029*** -0.038*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
ForeignFirm 0.136*** 0.052 -0.019** -0.019 -0.037*** -0.026* 
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) 
Preference -0.000 -0.058 0.040** 0.071** 0.012 0.066** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.018) (0.036) (0.015) (0.027) 
ShareUncalled 0.000 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ShareParValue -0.002 0.002 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IndustryMines 0.186*** 0.147** -0.059*** -0.080*** -0.055*** -0.050* 
 (0.043) (0.061) (0.013) (0.026) (0.013) (0.026) 
IndustryUtility 0.042 0.050 0.028 -0.005 -0.004 -0.019 
 (0.056) (0.076) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) (0.026) 
IndustryFinancial -0.058** -0.041 0.020** 0.023* -0.028** -0.031* 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) 
IndustryBreweries 0.007 -0.044 -0.023 -0.018 -0.014 -0.026 
 (0.046) (0.057) (0.017) (0.032) (0.022) (0.023) 
NumShareholders 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnershipDate -0.000 -0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
DivPayer  -0.068  0.070***  -0.023 
  (0.060)  (0.022)  (0.028) 
DivYield  0.007  -0.005**  -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Liquidity  -0.095*  0.009  0.040 
  (0.054)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
NumMarkets  -0.012  -0.010  0.001 
  (0.018)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
FamilyFirm  -0.089**  0.018  -0.031** 
  (0.035)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
NumDirectors  -0.011**  -0.012***  0.015*** 
  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
DirectorsNobility  0.009  0.008  0.019 
  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
CourtWoundup  0.042  -0.026  0.000 
  (0.071)  (0.036)  (0.024) 
Merged  0.087***  -0.021  -0.026** 
  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
HeadLondon  0.070*  -0.006  0.020 
  (0.041)  (0.021)  (0.017) 
HeadLanc  -0.037  0.051*  -0.002 
  (0.053)  (0.026)  (0.029) 
HeadYork  -0.054*  -0.033  0.010 
  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.016) 
LocalMiles  -0.001***  -0.000*  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.096 0.394 -3.626*** -1.897 0.475 -1.319 
 (1.971) (3.712) (0.664) (1.628) (0.817) (1.497) 
       
Observations 460 179 460 179 460 179 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 12.  Tobit regressions showing determinants of proportion of capital held by 
businessmen, finance professionals, and institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BusinessProp BusinessProp FinanceProp FinanceProp InstitutionProp InstitutionProp 
       
Age -0.002*** -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Size -0.022* -0.010 0.009 -0.009 0.022*** -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
ForeignFirm -0.135*** -0.079*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) 
Preference -0.037 -0.008 -0.010 -0.015* -0.021 -0.063** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.027) 
ShareUncalled 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ShareParValue 0.002** -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IndustryMines -0.056 0.049 0.004 0.001 -0.040 -0.046 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.019) (0.024) (0.029) (0.033) 
IndustryUtility -0.033 0.040 -0.032*** -0.032* 0.004 -0.016 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.012) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) 
IndustryFinancial 0.035 0.072** 0.015 0.014 -0.007 -0.024 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) 
IndustryBreweries 0.015 0.057 -0.039*** 0.007 0.048** 0.075** 
 (0.040) (0.058) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.031) 
NumShareholders -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnershipDate -0.002** -0.003* -0.001** -0.000 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
DivPayer  -0.055  0.007  0.008 
  (0.040)  (0.017)  (0.027) 
DivYield  0.002  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Liquidity  0.059  0.045***  0.027 
  (0.048)  (0.017)  (0.028) 
NumMarkets  0.004  0.008  0.013 
  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
FamilyFirm  0.105***  -0.002  -0.012 
  (0.036)  (0.008)  (0.027) 
NumDirectors  -0.002  -0.001  0.006** 
  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
DirectorsNobility  -0.043**  0.009  -0.016 
  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
CourtWoundup  0.089  -0.070***  -0.373 
  (0.076)  (0.023)  (0.000) 
Merged  -0.010  -0.011  -0.016 
  (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.016) 
HeadLondon  -0.079**  -0.011  -0.009 
  (0.039)  (0.009)  (0.026) 
HeadLanc  0.060  -0.004  -0.030 
  (0.053)  (0.012)  (0.027) 
HeadYork  0.128***  0.003  -0.008 
  (0.032)  (0.010)  (0.035) 
LocalMiles  0.001**  -0.000*  0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 4.504** 5.659* 1.512*** 0.296 -4.691*** -7.668*** 
 (1.742) (2.935) (0.575) (0.860) (1.445) (2.556) 
       
Observations 460 179 460 179 460 179 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 13.  Determinants of proportion of investors in each socio-occupational group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RentierNum WomenNum MiddleNum BusinessNum FinanceNum InsitutionNum 
       
Age -0.001 0.002*** 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.085*** -0.011 -0.036*** -0.016 -0.010* 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006) (0.001) 
ForeignFirm 0.067** -0.012 -0.022 -0.053** 0.009* 0.006*** 
 (0.031) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.005) (0.002) 
Preference -0.054* 0.060* 0.035** -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.017) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004) 
ShareUncalled -0.001** -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
ShareParValue 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
IndustryMines 0.115** -0.089*** -0.071*** 0.048 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.051) (0.030) (0.022) (0.043) (0.019) (0.004) 
IndustryUtility -0.013 0.007 0.005 0.023 -0.013 0.001 
 (0.048) (0.021) (0.033) (0.031) (0.009) (0.003) 
IndustryFinancial -0.059* 0.002 -0.021 0.076*** 0.013** -0.001 
 (0.036) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.006) (0.003) 
IndustryBreweries 0.014 -0.063* -0.010 0.066 -0.002 0.007** 
 (0.042) (0.036) (0.022) (0.050) (0.010) (0.003) 
NumShareholders -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OwnershipDate -0.003 0.004*** 0.001 -0.003** 0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
DivPayer -0.061 0.112*** -0.056** -0.043 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.054) (0.028) (0.025) (0.034) (0.012) (0.003) 
DivYield 0.008** -0.008*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Liquidity -0.055 -0.009 0.022 0.051 0.032** 0.005 
 (0.048) (0.028) (0.022) (0.041) (0.014) (0.004) 
NumMarkets -0.010 -0.015** 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.001) 
FamilyFirm -0.074** 0.037** -0.003 0.053* 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.028) (0.006) (0.003) 
NumDirectors -0.008* -0.016*** 0.017*** -0.003 -0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
DirectorsNobility 0.011 -0.004 0.019* -0.011 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.006) (0.002) 
CourtWoundup 0.074 0.020 0.010 -0.010 -0.050*** -0.048 
 (0.048) (0.030) (0.038) (0.054) (0.015) (0.000) 
Merged 0.090*** -0.024* -0.036*** -0.014 -0.011** 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.004) (0.002) 
HeadLondon 0.089*** 0.011 0.021 -0.090*** -0.003 0.000 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.017) (0.032) (0.006) (0.003) 
HeadLanc -0.043 0.026 -0.001 0.072 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.044) (0.023) (0.025) (0.045) (0.008) (0.003) 
HeadYork -0.064** -0.070*** 0.037** 0.126*** -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.015) (0.031) (0.006) (0.004) 
LocalMiles -0.001*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 4.211 -6.257*** -1.682 5.461** 0.075 -1.048*** 
 (2.922) (1.876) (1.399) (2.325) (0.536) (0.260) 
       
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description Data sources 
Shareholder variables (dependent variables)  
BusinessProp % of capital provided by businessmen  OR 
BusinessNum % of shareholder constituency made up of businessmen  OR 
FinanceProp % of capital provided by financiers and financial professionals OR 
FinanceNum % of shareholder constituency made up of financiers and financial professionals OR 
InstitutionProp % of capital provided by institutional shareholders  OR 
InstitutionNum % of shareholder constituency made up of institutional shareholders OR 
MiddleProp % of capital provided by middle classes  OR 
MiddleNum % of shareholder constituency made up of middle classes OR 
RentierProp % of capital provided by rentierrentier classes  OR 
RentierNum % of shareholder constituency made up of rentierrentier classes OR 
WomenProp % of capital provided by women  OR 
WomenNum % of shareholder constituency made up of women OR 
  
Company characteristics  
Age Numbers of years since incorporation AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
FamilyFirm A binary variable = 1 if firm is family firm (i.e., a director’s or large shareholder’s 
name is contained in firm name or two directors shares the same surname), 0 
otherwise 
OR, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
ForeignFirm A binary variable = 1 if firm’s headquarters or operations were outside of UK, 0 
otherwise 
SEY, SEOI, BOI 
Size Natural log of the total par (paid-up) value of the company OR, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
   
Share characteristics  
DivPayer A binary variable = 1 if firm is a dividend payer, 0 otherwise IMM 
DivYield Dividend in year t / price at end of year t-1 IMM 
Liquidity % of months in past year where end-of-month share price has not moved IMM 
NumMarkets Number of stock markets where shares were listed IMM, SEOI, BOI 
Preference A binary variable = 1 if firm has preference shares, 0 otherwise OR 
ShareUncalled Difference between the nominal and par value of a share OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
ShareParValue Par value (£) of each share OR, AoA, SEOI, BOI 
   
Industry binary variables  
IndustryBreweries A binary variable which equals 1 if company is a brewery, 0 otherwise AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryFinancial A binary variable which equals 1 if company is in financial sector, 0 otherwise AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryMines A binary variable which equals 1 if company is in mining industry, 0 otherwise AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryUtility A binary variable which equals 1 if company is a utility, 0 otherwise AoA, SEOI, BOI 
   
Control variables   
CourtWoundUp A binary variable = 1 if firm was wound up by court order, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
DirectorsNobility A binary variable = 1 if firm has a director with a title, 0 otherwise  
HeadLanc A binary variable which equals 1 if company has a head office in Lancashire, 0 
otherwise 
AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
HeadLondon A binary variable which equals 1 if company has a head office in London, 0 otherwise AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
HeadYork A binary variable which equals 1 if company has a head office in York, 0 otherwise AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI 
LocalMiles The distance (in miles) between a company’s head office and the main market where 
its shares are traded 
AoA, SEY, SEOI, BOI, 
Google maps 
NumShareholders Total number of shareholders in company OR 
NumDirectors Number of directors in company  
Merged A binary variable = 1 if firm merged into another firm, 0 otherwise RDC, EG, LG 
OwnershipDate Year in which ownership census was taken OR 
Notes: AoA = Articles of Association; BCCA = Burdett’s Collection of Company Accounts at the Guildhall Library; BOI = Burdett’s 
Official Intelligence; EG = Edinburgh Gazette: LG = London Gazette; IMM = Investor’s Monthly Manual; OR = ownership returns from 
national archives; RDC = Register of Defunct Companies; SEOI = Stock Exchange Official Intelligence; SEY = Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
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